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Introduction
high. It has demonstrated the pivotal nature of the relationships between expert advisors and socialruptures 1 (see also Althusser, 1969 and Foucault, 1969 , for other uses of these terms). He offers a 197 psychoanalytical approach to understanding objective knowledge, noting that the primary obstacle 198 to the progression of scientific thought is common sense. At the crux of these discussions is a 199 contestation of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity: it is the humanity, feelings and 200 impressions of the individual that present an obstacle to scientific progression (Bachelard, 1938) . In 201 contrast, scientific advice frequently depends upon such impressions: scientists' judgements are 202 based on their expertise but are inevitably subjective and may also depend on context (social and 203 scientific) . This liminal science may be uncomfortable and result in those participating being self-204 selecting. It may challenge accepted scientific methods and be forced to apply untested techniques 205 in the service of social need. However, this can also lead to breakthroughs both in the practice of 206 science and in its societal role (e.g. Donovan et al., 2012a; Sparks, 2007) . Aspects of the psyche that 207
Bachelard considered to be a hindrance to the progression of science ("epistemological obstacles") 208 may actually help the progression of scientific advisory practice. For example, recent work has 209 emphasised the importance of embracing subjectivity in science (O'Brien, 2010; Curtis, 2012) . From 210 a different perspective, the widely used method of "scenario planning" (Ringland and Schwartz, 211 1998; Alexander, 2000; Lindgren and Bandhold, 2002 ) requires a level of expert imagination -212 something also considered an obstacle by Bachelard. 213
Reading Bachelard through the lens of the last thirty years of research, we could surmise that 214 understanding the relationship between the self -complete with impressions, imaginings and 215 interpretations -and the "object" in nature is at the heart of negotiating uncertainty in scientific 216 advice. This is the foundation of the co-production idiom, and hints at its usefulness in bringing 217 together the social and physical sciences. It is the expert self that has to straddle the uncertainty-218 analysis. Experts have to interact both with peers and with "lay people" -including local officials and 220 populations. Bachelard viewed epistemological ruptures as positive: they advance human learning. 221
We suggest that extreme events such as volcanic eruptions, large earthquakes and other high 222 magnitude hazards can produce civic epistemological ruptures: they change the course of knowledge 223 production at the science-society interface, through shared experience and learning. If this occurs 224 efficiently, it will facilitate resilience as a part of adaptive capacity. If it fails and information is 225 disputed, unclear or unavailable, response to the hazard will be similarly delayed and confused as 226 expertise is assembled ad hoc. 227
The trial of six seismologists and a public official in Italy can be read as a civic epistemological 228 rupture: it has shaken the ways in which scientists think about providing advice and it has brought 229 the relationships between scientists and society in a particular place to light. In the next section, we 230 discuss the events in more detail, focussing particularly on the wider scientific response, in which 231 senior scientists and scientific institutions reactively strongly and quickly to a complex situation in a 232 way that was itself not at all 'scientific' (Alexander, 2014) . We show that many of the debates about 233 L'Aquila in the broader scientific community revolve around the establishment of authority -the 234 authority of "science", and also of particular people who practise it. This attempt to establish 235 authority works against science because it resists the ideas of co-production and civic epistemology. 236 duty to provide the state of knowledge in a comprehensive and unbiased fashion, to enable 261 authorities to take the required mitigation actions. This cannot be achieved under the threat of 262 public prosecution. A negative impact of this trial and sentence will be to make scientists reluctant to 263 serve on risk advisory commissions or express expert opinions. " International Association of
Events at L'Aquila and the construction of authority
In the rest of this paper, we approach the civic epistemological opportunities of disasters through 309 four key themes within a co-production framework, summarised in Figure 1 -though it should be 310 noted that there are connections and links between and within the boxes shown in the figure.  311 Initially, we discuss the issue of "locating expertise" -the institutional and networked context of 312 expert advisory groups in society. This is important in disasters because disasters are time-critical. 313
There is rarely time to assemble an expert advisory group in a crisis. We use some recent examples 314 to illustrate this issue, which ultimately concerns the ways in which science and social order are cothe ways in which science is represented to stakeholders. In particular, it examines the 317 representation of uncertainty -a major problem at L'Aquila, for example. One of the problems with 318 uncertainty in an acute setting is that it undermines the perceived authority of science and tends to 319 result in the rhetoric of "objectivity". The co-production of science and social order, however, 320 requires a careful framing of uncertainty. Thirdly, we address the context of expertise. Much 321 valuable social scientific research in DRR has concerned the role of local knowledge and of local 322 perceptions of risk. Co-production and the negotiation of civic epistemological ruptures requires an 323 awareness of the context of scientific advice, and many studies have provided insights into the 324 integration of local and scientific knowledges for DRR. Finally, we consider the issue of "governing 325 expertise". When stakes are high, it is critical that experts' positions in relation to governance and 326 responsibility are clear. While expertise should be accountable in a democracy, it should also be 327 protected. Fergus, a former deputy Governor of the island, felt that, given the evidence -which included 352 several seismic crises in the twentieth century -it "should not have been a secret" (Fergus, 2004) 353 that the volcano was reactivating. The fault lay, he felt, with the lack of uptake of the Wadge and 354
Isaacs report by the local government. Scientific knowledge was not adequately communicated or 355 received. Thus, the eruption came as a shock to many inhabitants, and the act of coming to terms 356 with it was essentially one of mourning and re-identification with their reshaped island (Skelton, 357 2003; Donovan et al., 2011) . The failure of scientific knowledge to penetrate planning was an 358 obstacle to flexible and rapid management of the eruption in 1995 (Clay et al., 1999) . There were no 359 volcanologists on Montserrat itself, so scientists from the University of the West Indies, from 360 universities in the UK, and from the Volcanic Disasters Assistance Program in the USA were brought 361 in to provide the necessary information. Unfortunately, as noted above, there is a high level of 362 uncertainty in a volcanic crisis, and in 1995 there was a lack of consensus between these groups 363 institutional, legislative and political frameworks for managing the eruption, and resulted in the 365 formation of institutions, laws and committees over a period of several years of chronic crisis 366 (Pattullo, 2000; Clay et al., 1999) . There were also differences in the pace of acquiring scientific 367 structures (which occurred fairly rapidly) and formalising them (which took several years -the 368 volcano observatory was formalised by government Act in 1999 and the scientific advisory 369 committee in 2003, partly in response to fear of litigation; Donovan et al., 2012d) . 370
As noted above, critics of the scientists who were convicted in the court cast concerning the L'Aquila 371 earthquake argued that the selection of these scientists was politically motivated, and that their 372 political allegiances impacted their judgement (e.g. Hall, 2011). The ways in which governments 373 select scientists are varied, but often involve informal networks, or key, government-backed 374 scientific institutions (e.g. Jasanoff, 2005; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2012) . This snowball-like 375 method of selection depends upon the integrity of those involved in suggesting the names of people 376 who may be more appropriate -particularly in time-critical contexts. The source of scientific 377 authority must also be considered: Jasanoff (2005) notes that in the UK, choice of experts may 378 depend as much on previous service to society as on knowledge. There are also some important 379 differences between nations concerning how authority is constructed, and this relates very closely toof which decisions about volcanic ash had been taken, and a breakdown of communication between 
